Peering Out Into the Future

The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense has published a fascinating 169-page report, "Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040," which aims to provide a wide-ranging understanding of what they call "the future strategic environment" and to identify the challenges to which the country's armed forces may have to respond.

While I don't necessarily accept some of the report's conclusions (e.g., "globalization is likely to continue," "sufficient energy, food and freshwater resources are likely to be available to sustain the growing global population and the global economy," and "total war, harnessing the full power of industrial states, war between major Western powers, and war between liberal democracies, are all unlikely"), I generally agree with a number of them, including those detailed in the following brief excerpts:

The distribution of global power will change. Out to 2040, the locus of global power will move away from the United States (US) and Europe towards Asia, as the global system shifts from a uni-polar towards a multi-polar distribution of power. This shift, coupled with the global challenges of climate change, resource scarcity and population growth, is likely to result in a period of instability in international relations, accompanied by the possibility of intense competition between major powers. The hegemonic dominance of the US will fade. She is likely to remain the pre-eminent military power, although, in political, economic and military terms, she is likely to be increasingly constrained as others grow in influence and confidence. However, the rise of individual states, such as China, should not be considered a certainty given the nature and magnitude of the challenges they face, nor should their eventual influence be over-estimated. Instead there will be several states and institutions competing for regional and global influence, cooperating and competing within the international community.

...

New ideologies will emerge, driven by religion, ethnic differences, nationalism, inequality or a combination of these factors. Ideological conflicts are likely to occur and extremist groups may use violence to achieve political objectives. There may be a resurgence of anti-capitalist ideologies, such as Marxism. Diaspora communities are likely to increase in size and influence and many will bring economic benefits to their host states. However, those that fail to integrate are likely to remain reservoirs for resentment. Some of these groups are likely to become involved in ideologically driven conflicts, and may act as proxies for other states. Similarly, host states may be drawn into regions and conflicts that reflect the interests of their diaspora communities.

...

The proliferation of modern weapons’ technologies, and probably Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), will generate instability and shift the military balance of power in various regions. Counter-proliferation initiatives are unlikely to be wholly successful, and nuclear weapons are likely to proliferate. Terrorist groups are likely to acquire and use chemical, biological and radiological weapons possibly through organised crime groups. Many states are likely to develop ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, as well as conventional payloads. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and other air defence technologies may mitigate some of the risk, but they are unlikely to remove the threat completely.

The report also includes several interesting charts, including one which identifies parts of the world that are and may be especially prone to conflict in the decades ahead:

Click here to read more.

(Hat tip to The Prudent Investor.)

Comments

[roger]

In a sense, the greatest of all Diaspora is the US and all
the continental America.
FATALISM is the new "ISM " of the 21sf. century.

[roger]

When the stork dropped me in the chimney, world population
was 2 billion as opposed to 7 to day,U S A was 110 million as
opposed to 307 million today,California was 568 thousand as
oppsed to 37 million to day. Calvin Coolidge was the first
president to use radio and England ruled the world with an
iron fist. anybody out there foolish enough to predict the future environment-- lets say around 2095?

[macdoro]

This is the most interesting part of the report:

Strategic Shocks
The strategic context in 2040 is not shaped just by trends and drivers. On occasion, single events can provide discontinuities that cut across existing trends and re-shape the strategic environment. Such an event is a strategic shock. Historic examples of these high-impact low probability events include:
• The 2007-8 financial crisis.
• The 9/11 terrorist attacks.
• The collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Strategic shocks have a cascade effect, leading to multiple, apparently unconnected and unforeseen changes. They transform the strategic context, changing behaviour and activity across the board. For example, the 2007 financial crisis began with US sub-prime debt. Failures in this relatively obscure area were magnified by a number of factors including high-levels of interconnectedness, a lack of confidence, and the complexity of the global financial system. The cascade effect brought the entire global financial system close to collapse. This in turn led to a transformed strategic context that had economic, geopolitical and social effects as the shock waves travelled outwards. The medium to long term effects of this crisis are uncertain, however, the implications of this strategic shock may yet be significant, or even catastrophic.
Other complex, interconnected global systems may also be at risk of systemic failure. This includes globalisation itself, which can be thought of as an amalgam of multiple complex sub-systems spanning the social, economic, financial and geopolitical domains. These systems are typically difficult to understand, and are subject to no overall control and variable standards of regulation. Moreover, their resilience is difficult to assess and measure, and confidence in the integrity of the system is often fundamental to its effective functioning. Examples include: the global system for trade and the supply lines and infrastructure that underpin it; energy and food supplies; and the global communications system, with its dependence on space-based utilities. Out to 2040, global interdependence and reliance on complex systems is likely to continue to increase. This provides many benefits, but may make future strategic shocks and the systemic failures more frequent and pervasive than in the past.
This section considers what some of these high impact, low-probability events could be, while recognising that others may be beyond our experience to anticipate, conceive or understand. It is not a comprehensive list. Acknowledgement that shocks will happen is important. It is recognition that the future cannot be predicted in detail or with certainty. However, they will inevitably influence defence and security in some way, providing a strong argument for versatile and adaptable defence institutions, equipment and personnel to deal with the unexpected challenges they will present.
The following is a selection of credible strategic shocks:

• Collapse of a Pivotal State. The sudden collapse of a pivotal state would threaten regional and global stability. For example, the descent into instability of a major hydrocarbon exporting state, such as Nigeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia or Russia, would have local and regional consequences, disrupting global energy supplies. This would affect global energy markets causing widespread economic, social and political dislocation. Similarly, if internal tensions caused instability within China the global economy could be disrupted by the simultaneous drop in demand for raw materials and reduced supply.
• Cure for Ageing. The development of a treatment that could prevent or cure the effects of ageing would have a significant impact on global society. Initial access to such an advance could be highly unequal and only be available to wealthier members of society, mostly in the developed world. The whole fabric of society would be challenged and new norms and expectations would rapidly develop in response to the change.
• New Energy Source. A novel, efficient form of energy generation could be developed that rapidly lowers demand for hydrocarbons. For example, the development of commercially available cold fusion reactors could result in the rapid economic marginalisation of oil-rich states. This loss of status and income in undiversified economies could lead to state-failure and provide opportunities for extremist groups to rise in influence.
• Collapse of Global Communications. A failure of the global communications system could occur for a variety of reasons; for example the destruction of satellites following an orbital electromagnetic pulse detonation or solar flare, or the complete overload of the global ICT infrastructure. Such an event is not without precedent. For example, in 1859, solar flare activity was linked to the collapse of the telegraph system when spark discharges shocked telegraph operators and set telegraph paper on fire. A similar collapse in the modern world would cause trade, commerce and the Internet to grind to a halt. Military operations dependent on the availability of communications networks would also be put at risk. Remaining bandwidth would see intense competition for access.
• External Influences. A number of strategic shocks could occur that are broadly outside the control of society, but would have considerable impact. These include a highly lethal pandemic, a geological or meteorological event of unprecedented scale, such as the eruption of a super-volcano, or the discovery of non-terrestrial intelligent life. In the military domain, the development of a new, as yet unforeseen capability that allows one state to exercise technological dominance over others would have a significant impact on the strategic context. Potential examples could include; quantum decryption, whole-scale application of nano-technology, biotechnology weapons or advanced robotics. This could ultimately result in the defeat of a Western military force on the battlefield in a ‘maxim gun’ moment, against an adversary who has the technological advantage over the West.

Note: The maxim gun moment refers to the Battle of Omburman when the British defeated the Mahdist forces with losses of only 47 on the British side against around 10 000 on the Mahdist. Elements of the 1991 Gulf War, such as the destruction of Iraqi forces on the Basra Road, provide a similar example of military superiority.